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Gulyás Attila  
[attila.gulyas@mil.hu](mailto:attila.gulyas@mil.hu)

## ENABLE COMMAND AND CONTROL BY UPDATED DEPLOYABLE CIS DEVICES

### *Abstract*

*The International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) are to reduce its personnel and capabilities. In time of restructuring our forces, there is a need to continue providing high standards Communications and Information System connectivity between ANSF Advisory Teams/Security Forces Assistance Teams and Regional Headquarters. One of the most improved services is the tactical satellite connection and the devices that make that possible in this harsh environment. In the short article the author would like to sum up the methods and the possibilities enabling command and control by deployable communications equipment.*

*A Nemzetközi Biztonsági Együttműködő Erők (ISAF) műveleti képességeinek csökkenésével a személyi állomány létszamarányai is változnak, átalakításra kerülnek. Az átalakítás időszakában is szükség van magas színvonalú híradó és informatikai szolgáltatások biztosítására az Afgán Nemzeti Biztonsági Erők támogatását megvalósító Tanácsadói Csoportok és az ISAF Vezetési Pontok között. Az egyik alkalmazott, fejlett szolgáltatásokat biztosító rendszer a harcászati műholdas összeköttetések rendszere. A szerző rövid összefoglalójában bemutatja az alkalmazott összeköttetési módokat és a mögöttük álló lehetőségeket a telepíthető (tábori) híradó és informatikai rendszerek területén.*

**Keywords:** *tactical satellite, CIS support ~ harcászati műholdas összeköttetés, híradó és informatikai támogatás*

## INTRODUCTION

The international forces, in support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic developments in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population [1]. In accordance with all the relevant Security Council Resolutions<sup>1</sup> [2], the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF)'s main role is to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of secure and stable environment. ISAF forces are conducting security and stability operations throughout the country together with the Afghan National Security Forces and are directly involved in the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Police (ANP) through mentoring, training and equipping. ISAF is supporting reconstruction and development (R&D) in Afghanistan, securing areas in which reconstruction work is conducted by other national and international actors. ISAF is also providing practical support for R&D efforts, as well as support for humanitarian assistance efforts conducted by Afghan government organizations, international organizations and Non Governmental Organizations. ISAF is helping the Afghan Authorities strengthen the institutions required to fully establish good governance and rule of law and to promote human rights. The principal mission in this respect consists of building capacity, supporting the growth of governance structures and promoting an environment within which governance can improve [3].

### EFFORTS OF ISAF COMBINED TEAM NORTH IN TIME OF RESTRUCTURING

ISAF's intent is to keep ANSF in lead and continuously strengthen their abilities to provide security in all Afghanistan. The idea is to effectively utilize all available Regional Command (RC) resources in cooperation with civilian authorities along with governmental and non governmental organizations to contribute to lasting development in Afghanistan. The aim is to establish processes which are feasible and sustainable for the ANSF and which set the stage for a secure transition to post-ISAF [4].

ISAF's enduring priorities may be the following [5]:

- Support ANSF Senior Leadership and key ANSF HQs professionalization;
- Support ANSF in developing logistics and maintenance capabilities;
- Support ANSF infrastructure sustainment;
- Support ANSF in developing organic enablers like:
  - a) ANSF EOD<sup>2</sup> and C-IED<sup>3</sup>
  - b) ANSF Medical Capabilities incl. CASEVAC<sup>4</sup> and MEDEVAC<sup>5</sup>
  - c) ANSF CIS<sup>6</sup>
- Support OCC-R/P<sup>7</sup> developments;
- Support ANSF non-kinetic capabilities (e.g. InfoOps<sup>8</sup>, PA<sup>9</sup>, CIMIC<sup>10</sup>).

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<sup>1</sup> United Nations Security Council document S/RES/2096 (2013)

<sup>2</sup> EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal

<sup>3</sup> C-IED – Counter – Improvised Explosive Devices

<sup>4</sup> CASEVAC – CASualty EVACuation

<sup>5</sup> MEDEVAC – MEDical EVACuation

<sup>6</sup> CIS – Communications and Information System

<sup>7</sup> OCC-R/P - Operational Coordination Center Region/Province

<sup>8</sup> INFOOPS – Information Operations

<sup>9</sup> PA – Public Affairs

In support of ISAF operations, Regional Commands will simultaneously conduct theatre redeployment operations including the necessary base closure/transfer in line with HQ IJC Unified Implementation Plan.

### **HOW CAN ISAF REACH ITS GOALS?**

ISAF may continue to train, assist and advise ANSF in areas with permanent ISAF presence. Among the ANSF, Regional Commands increasingly focuses on Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police BDEs as they are in charge for securing key terrain, the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) and the Afghan Local Police (ALP) as the primary means for providing security. As ANSF capabilities steadily increase ISAF will „thin-up“ their Security Forces Assistance (SFA) operations from „Brigade and provincial level“ to „Corps and regional level“ in a gradual approach [6]. ISAF continue to liaise and co-operate with the GIRoA to support development of governance. Operational momentum and SFA requirements will be synchronized with redeployment activities and the reset of the theatre. The overall plan will be supported by Information and Communication Activities.

### **POST-2014 END STATUS**

ISAF mission may come to a successful ending when ANSF have taken over lead security responsibility in designated transition areas and have established a safe and secure environment for the third presidential and provincial council elections; ANSF retains security in Regional Commands' Key Terrains; ANP has security primacy in main population centers and possesses the capability, capacity to protect the Afghan population as well as the Border Crossing Points (BXPs); Enemy of Afghanistan (INS11) are operationally defeated and denied of safe havens in key terrains; their ability to threaten secured areas and main population centers has been disrupted and they are incapable of successfully undermining the legitimate and sovereign GIRoA; develop a more self-sustainable GIRoA with stronger connections between different levels of government; support development processes; act in accordance with Afghan Law and is accepted by the majority of the population; Coalition Force Posture and redeployment activities are synchronized with the momentum of SFA and ANSF operations; identified bases are successfully closed/transferred; GIRoA-ANSF-ISAF activities have been successfully communicated and positively perceived by target audiences [7].

The International Community's (IC) vision is that the Afghan National Security Forces is deemed competent to ensure safe and secure environment in many parts of the ISAF Area of Interest (AOI) without ISAF partnering and mentoring support. The Coalition Forces led by United States of America (USA) have generated and equipped afghan troops, have provided infrastructure adequate for the ANSF of 352k in accordance with GIRoA, NATO/ISAF and ISAF IJC priorities [8]. Long term planning for the future ANSF force size and International Community funding of the ANSF is almost certain to result in a smaller force post 2015. As a consequence of the equipping of the ANSF for a 352k force structure, GIRoA is going to find itself in possession of excess equipment and infrastructure should the force size be adjusted post 2015. Any coalition retrograde operations which result in transfer of equipment and infrastructure to the ANSF will exacerbate the fiscal burden which the international community and GIRoA will bear in sustaining the ANSF. This will occur at a time when the security ministries and the ANSF logistics systems are in the nascent stage of development

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<sup>10</sup> CIMIC – Civil-Military Cooperation

<sup>11</sup> INS – Insurgents = Enemies of Afghanistan (COMISAF-approved term for insurgent troops)

and unable to sustain the increased demands of a large un-forecasted and unprogrammed equipment and infrastructure influx.

The opportunity and the challenge is how ISAF can provide support for own troops and ANSF as well during the restructuring and redeployment period. The CIS connectivity is one of the main efforts of any commander in theatre with primary and secondary objectives. In the next few chapters I would like to discover the commanding system between company/battalion levels and higher to Corps/Headquarters (HQ) level, to highlight the importance of CIS support and sum up the possibility of developments.

## **PROVIDING CIS SUPPORT FOR ISAF RESTRUCTURING**

The continuing development of the Afghan National Security Forces is a crucial factor towards transition and therefore long term ISAF mission success in Afghanistan. A key element of this is the ability of the ANSF to communicate operationally and tactically, and exercise command and control at all levels within the operational area. Regional Commands and subordinate units need to monitor and develop the forces, through partnering and mentoring the ANSF communications capability at the Corps/HQ level and below. This includes direction to Regional Commands to formalize ANA/ANP/ISAF partnering, circulation for comment of the draft ANA/ANP assessment criteria.


The developments should focus on ANA/ANP collective communications capability, building on the solid foundations provided by individual courses under the guidance of NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) and Coalition Training and Advisory Group – Afghanistan (CTAG-A) by the view of partnering and mentoring ANSF forces. Partnering and mentoring are defined as follows [9]. *Partnering is an assigned relationship between like-size and like-type ISAF and ANSF units in which both share the goal of working together, “shoulder-to-shoulder” to build capacity and capability. Ideally, the units should live, work, plan, train and conduct full spectrum combat operations together. Mentoring has some differences. The mentor teaches, guides, and advises the ANSF unit by providing information and advice on how to best use the resources available within the Afghan construct. Mentoring is focused on building individual competency and capacity within the leadership and staff of the ANSF so that it is able to perform individual, leader and collective tasks. ANA mentors are referred to as Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT) and ANP mentors are referred to as Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (POMLT).* Both partnering and mentoring require rapid, ready and reliable communications and information system built-on to support the acting commanders and his/her staffs in the military decision making processes and provide timely and secure communications channels for the near-real-time connections. To provide seamless functions of command and control for partnering and mentoring teams, the following CIS services are necessary during ISAF restructuring and redeployment:

- Provides the ISAF Headquarters with an on-call contingency communications capability in the event that the fixed strategic network is disrupted or for other contingency operations;
- Provide deployable communications systems capable of supporting command and control;
- Provide connectivity between deployed elements, control centers and other users of the coalition strategic network;
- Focus on deployable capabilities, quick-reaction and limited-duration missions;
- Provide a capability to implement initial communications during the early phases of the teams’ response to a crisis or other operations as prescribed by the Team Headquarters;

- Provide the Headquarters with redundant and geographically independent capability to reconstitute communications in the event of a disaster, attack or other contingency scenario.

The primary mission of the CIS support shall be to deploy on order in support of Corps/HQ-level missions within area of operations; install, operate, maintain and manage tactical primary, secondary and contingency communications in support of HQs, subordinate units and other governmental agencies in the area of operations for upgraded command and control capability. The secondary mission of the CIS support shall be to provide the Corps Headquarters with redundant and geographically independent capability to reconstitute communications in the event of a disaster, attack or other contingency scenarios [10].


The acting force commander along with the staff determines operational and contingency missions the unit must support. Under the direction of the force commander, the operations branch (G3) with inputs for annexes from the staff, develops and publishes deployment orders. The communications branch (G6) is responsible for developing the communications annexes. The signal battalion (Bn) commander will direct the battalion S3 to determine the communications requirements to support the deployed element. Bn operations section (S3) develops and publishes orders for the company to support the mission. The Bn S3 is responsible for coordination with the requesting unit's S3 for communications and life support. Once the communications element deploys, they are Operationally Controlled (OPCON) by the supported unit, but remain Administratively Controlled (ADCON) to the signal battalion (Figure 01). Upon mission completion the unit and all support personnel will redeploy with all equipment to the signal battalion. Movement to home station will be in accordance with the deployment order.



**1. figure.** Operating concept flow<sup>12</sup>

The signal battalion, upon receiving requirements, determines the size and scope of the communications element deployed to support the requesting unit. Deploying units only articulate requirements; they do not dictate the size and scope of the communications company or unit. Mission success depends upon two equally important components, operations and support. Support of the asset or system is critical to operation success. The six facets of readiness will be used to address support issues. These include people, training, equipment, support, infrastructure and information.

<sup>12</sup> The author's theoretical planning for operating concept



**2. figure. Signal battalion (theoretical)** <sup>13</sup>

The signal battalion can provide CIS connectivity for ISAF forces in time of redeployment (retrograde). Its force structure makes it possible to support the force commander's different requirements. The theoretical signal battalion schema (Figure 02) gives us some interpretations how Coalition Forces can sum up the combat support CIS system. The four (4) companies<sup>14</sup> (SIGCOYs) provide HF/VHF/UHF connectivity and tactical satellite connections up to NATO/ISAF SECRET level for Coalition Forces. The manning of those SIGCOYs is eligible for proper and successful managements of radio communications systems. The SIGCOYs have tactical radio (signal) platoons for installing, operating and maintenance of tactical radio equipment (Tactical Satellite TACSAT) in field operations as well. Due to the hilly area mostly all over Afghanistan does not take opportunity at all times to make seamless Line of Sight (LoS) connectivity between troops, it is important to provide satellite LoS channels for better troop communications' manners [11]. That is why TACSAT platoon is one of the most important sub force in case of quick and seamless troop/team communications. In the next chapter I would like to provide an overview about the needs and the do's, the solutions of Tactical Satellite capability.

## TACTICAL SATELLITE (TACSAT) CONNECTIONS

TACSAT provides ISAF with a secure, static and mobile communications capability, complementing the ISAF fixed voice and data communications networks. It is used as a method of Beyond Line of Sight Combat Net Radio (BLoSCNR) and gives users the ability to contact any other suitably equipped user who has been granted network access rights, and to broadcast to all users of the network simultaneously. In the ISAF the TACSAT is primarily for voice communications usage, a data capability is built within the radios but the necessary ancillary equipment - mostly - will not be provided. A single Office Module (OM) with IP data capability will be provided for Special Operations Forces (SOF) HQ. Although there are different types and models of TACSAT equipment in use within ISAF, they all have three possibilities of employment: On-The-Pause (OTP), On-The-Move (OTM) and Manpack (MP).

The On-The-Pause model describes the mode of operation where the TACSAT radio travels with its antenna stowed. The antenna must be erected, positioned, pointed and connected to the TACSAT radio before transmission or reception is possible. This has the advantage of using highly efficient directional antenna that can boost signal strength

<sup>13</sup> The author's theoretical plan

<sup>14</sup> Three (3) of the SIGCOYs are operational, one (1) SIGCOY is for reserve supporting forces

significantly, but takes time to set up. OTP includes desk-mounted stations that have larger, more robust directional antennas.

On-The-Move describes the mode of operation where the antenna mounted to a vehicle and is fixed to the TACSAT radio at all times. This has the advantage of being permanently available to receive or transmit, but the antennas are omnidirectional and do little to boost signal strength in difficult areas.

Manpack describes the mode of operation where the TACSAT is used in a field pack if units are dismounted from vehicles. It has an autonomous power supply by 2 rechargeable batteries in a battery box.

Due to the extended range at which TACSAT communications can be intercepted, ISAF encrypts all of its TACSAT channels to CONFIDENTIAL. Timings for crypto changes can be found by contacting the Crypto Custodian or looking in Special Instructions (SPINs) and the Electronic Key Management Record. The type of encryption device and associated keymat used is determined by the bandwidth of the channel to be encrypted or the mission supported by the network:

- NB<sup>15</sup>: ISAF NB channels can only be encrypted using the Advanced Narrow band Digital Voice Terminal (ANDVT) series of COMSEC;
- WB<sup>16</sup>: ISAF WB channels can only be encrypted using the crypto key VINSON series of COMSEC;
- SOCCE (Special Operations Command and Control Element): SOCCE networks utilize a different encryption keys;
- DAMA<sup>17</sup>: DAMA channels additionally use orderwire encryptions;
- PERIODICITY: Keys currently have a weekly periodicity. Exact time can be found on Electronic Key Management Record.

The main formats for TACSAT channel access are the dedicated channel (DC) and the Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA). The DC is assigned by the appropriate authority for a specific use. The DAMA channel is one that is assigned to users who do not need to use the channel constantly.

The TACSAT radio command nets will be used as the primary, and only all-informed, secure C2 channel between Regional Commands and their Task Forces and Maneuver Units. These channels provide a regional “Troops in Contact” (TIC) net, which permits regional response to SIGACTS<sup>18</sup> without dominating in the Common Operational Picture. Units requiring additional call signs or use of the net in support of operations will coordinate with the regional command TACSAT controller.

There are different types of TACSAT radio nets organized by proper purposes supporting ISAF command and control systems. The TACSAT net for Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC) for requesting Close Air Support (CAS) is allocated by the Joint Command Air Support Operations Center (ASOC). Another TACSAT net model is a secondary request net (SRN) and this is for back-up to JTAC nets. It is a controlled net which provides secure voice communications for CAS support to ISAF forces. A controlled net means that it is intended for authorized users and authorized purposes only. Unauthorized use may result in a denial of further net usage or possible punitive action. The Special Operations Forces (SOF) Command

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<sup>15</sup> Narrow Band (NB). NB channel is 5 KHz wide. This is adequate for voice communications, but may be more difficult to maintain whilst moving. This provides efficient use of scarce satellite bandwidth.

<sup>16</sup> Wideband (WB). WB channel is 25 KHz wide. This is better for data communications and provides better voice communications, but reduces the overall number of channels that can be allocated.

<sup>17</sup> DAMA: Demand Assigned Multiple Access

<sup>18</sup> SIGACT – Significant Actions

Nets support voice and data in order to enable operational Command and Control of SOF's in-theatre operations.

The TACSAT nets are always demand assigned and tailored for providing the best form of tactical and operational level of supporting the battle planning and executions.

### **SUPPORTING THE BOOTS IN GROUND OVER NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN**

The ability to establish remote CIS points of presence (PoP) provides additional operational flexibility to ISAF forces. A PoP can be established by use of a mobile communications package tailored to meet operational requirements. A mobile asset based on mission requirements and may be consisted by the following systems [12]:

- DEU<sup>19</sup> nanoPoP;
- DEU microPoP;
- NATO MiniPoP, ISAF Mobile Communications Detachment (IMCD), Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT), Dual Band Auto Pointing Rapid Deployable Terminal (DART), Bi-Band Suitcase Satellite Terminal (BBSST) and/or Deployable Satellite Ground Terminal (DSGT).

The miniPoP system is not a deployable system so this is for stable operational environments. The following system descriptions are going to be covering the deployable CIS (TACSAT) assets. The provision of mobile PoPs will allow Coalition Forces to expand the ISAF Secret Core Network across ISAF, thereby enabling respective troops the ability to join the ISAF Command and Control architecture.

The nanoPoP system is a simple, manpack satellite system using the BGAN<sup>20</sup> channels connected to laptop computer for the deployed forces' communications support (Figure 03).



**3. figure.** NanoPoP satellite system in operation [13]

The nanoPoP system provides one (1) ISAF SECRET (mission secret) BGAN communications channel with an approximately 20 kg weight that is eligible for a dismounted soldier to hold, install, operate and maintain the system by her/his own.

The microPoP provides a bandwidth of 512 kbit/s, 2x VoSIP<sup>21</sup>, 6x ISAF SECRET workstations, 6x headsets, 2x NATO unclassified workstations, 1x USB<sup>22</sup> cameras, 1x ISAF SECRET network printer. The microPoP is deployed with a Receive Broadcast Management (RBM) satellite communications (SatCom) terminal. The microPoP is a self sustainable system, containing heating and cooling units. The overall weight of all equipment will be approximately 800 kg; a total of boxes must be booked as cargo, along with two passengers.

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<sup>19</sup> DEU - Deutschland

<sup>20</sup> BGAN – Broadband Global Area Network: global satellite network with portable terminals for voice and data services. The terminals connect to a laptop computer, the line-of-sight to the satellite is necessary. Downlink/uplink speeds of BGAN terminals are up to 492 kbit/s.

<sup>21</sup> VoSIP – Voice over Secret Internet Protocol

<sup>22</sup> USB – Universal Serial Bus



Additional capacity of transporting is required if a mobile power generator is necessary. The Figure 04 shows the built-up of microPoP system.



**4. figure.** MicroPoP system built-up [14]

The configuration consists of as follows:

- Receive Broadcast Management terminal (RBM);
- Heating/Cooling;
- Black System;
- Red System;
- 6x Equipment-Boxes;
- 1x ISAF SECRET printer;
- 6x ISAF SECRET laptops;
- 2x NATO unclassified laptops;
- 2x Voice over SECRET IP (VoSIP) phones;
- 1x USB-Camera;
- Lightning protection.

Regarding to physical space, the environmentally controlled space must be allocated for red (classified systems) and black (unclassified systems) equipment with a minimum of 1 meter separation. The area around the proposed deployment site, including the transport box, network equipment and generator must be fenced with minimum 3x wire corridor and lockable door. The black side and red side will consist of transport boxes one for black side, and one for red side, containing a switch, TCE<sup>23</sup> 621B and UPS<sup>24</sup>. The satellite terminal must have an unobstructed view of a proper, approximately 200 degree azimuth and approximately 40 degree<sup>25</sup> elevation. A completely leveled elevated 3m square is required for the terminal footprint to prevent submersion during rain or other austere weather. Suitable location to install earth-point/grounding is required. The 1.2m satellite dish can provide 2Mb/s data channel bandwidth that allow the users to simultaneously use the 6x laptop computers and download and upload voice and data IP packets via satellite in Ku-band.

The MicroPoP system is not a stationery solution however it offers a great opportunity to join the ISAF SECRET cloud without any service reductions or loss. The VSAT connectivity provides wideband and narrowband connection to ISAF stationer systems and workstations and can provide connectivity to other Afghan Mission Network (AMN) systems.

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<sup>23</sup> TCE – Telecommunications Cryptoized Equipment

<sup>24</sup> UPS - Uninterruptible Power Supply

<sup>25</sup> The azimuth and the elevation are valid in mid-Asia (per.es in Afghanistan, Pakistan) only. It is belongs to the system geographical installation.

## **ASSESSMENT AND DEDUCTIONS**

In regards of service orientation at the ISAF tactical and operational headquarters levels, standard procedures of command and control are generally known throughout the commands, the commanders are effective with the deliberate planning process. Commanders plan, direct, and synchronize operations supported by communications while maintaining command and control of their subordinate elements with limited or no assistance. Development at the company level and delegation by commanders are areas of improvement, to include integrating company and platoon leaders into decision making, planning, and battle tracking operations. Maintenance and resource procurement is another area that needs improvement. This lack of visibility and understanding on sustainment threatens the ISAF progress and severely limits further ISAF advancement.

The usage of tactical satellite system has several benefits in the operational area which are not changeable to ground-ground or ground-air-ground radio connections. Providing seamless tactical satellite channels in tactical and operational level gives the commanders broaden moving possibilities between areas of responsibilities. The man-hold tactical satellite systems facilitate the sustaining processes of ISAF forces in the time of ISAF restructuring and provide positive inputs to commanders.

## **SUMMARY**

The ISAF as a whole has made progress, although communications standards and quality are not uniform across the formations. There is still work to be done in the development and implementation of enduring and sustainable systems. At the operational level, ISAF IJC is partnering with the Afghan National Security Forces which includes advising and mentoring on systems, planning efforts and orders development, to include the seasonal orders. The ANSF continues to make progress in integrating staff functions into the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP).

Cross-pillar command and control continues to be reactive and requires concerted effort from advisors and ANSF leadership at all levels. However, advisory effort and ANSF leaders have demonstrated moments of improved capability. Although this cross-pillar coordination is encouraging, the complex plan to secure this vulnerable event is a long way from complete and will require intense advisor support until event execution. Because of the direction, planning, coordination, and synchronization across the entirety of the ISAF and the Afghan government, it should recognize and take note of this operation as a significant step in ISAF and ANSF command and control capacity. Although enemy contact was limited in the year of 2013, ISAF and ANSF leaders were able to successfully synchronize the CIS installations and maneuvers of this large force [15].

Enable seamless and updated CIS connectivity in time of redeployment and ISAF reductions, this is the primary effort of ISAF commanders in field. Support command and control by using TACSAT equipment is one of the most important challenge of the international community. The ISAF and the German Armed Forces' answer for those challenges is the Point of Presence's system applications. This is a successful development and need to be improved. Increasing the usage of those CIS devices give the user possibility to spare time for their basic job in time of reduction (troops and equipment, devices and vehicles). After the last phase of redeploying has been finished, the PoP-elements can be eligible for NATO forces in other hot-spot/battle-area of the Globe.

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## Abbreviations

KEY TERM	DEFINITION
ABP	Afghan Border Police
ALP	Afghan Local Police
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANCOP	Afghan Civil Order Police
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
AUP	Afghan Uniform Police
BDE	Brigade
BN	Battalion
CASEVAC	Casualty evacuation
CIS	Communication and Information Systems
C-IED	Counter - improvise explosive devices
CIMIC	Civil-military cooperations
COM	Commander
COP	Combat Observation Post
COY	Company
CT	Combined Team
CT-N	Combined Team North
EOD	Explosive ordnance detachment
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GOV/DEV	Governance and Development
HQ	Headquarters
IC	International Community
IJC	ISAF Joint Command
INFOOPS	Information operations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
HHC	Headquarters – headquarters cell
KDK	Kandak, Afghan Term for Battalion
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission Afghanistan
PA	Public Affairs
RC N	Regional Command North
RMTC	Regional Military Training Command
OCC-P/R	Operational coordination center province/region
OM	Office module
OTP	On-the-pause
OTM	On-the-move
TACSAT	Tactical satellite
TCN	Troop Contributing Nation
UIP	Unified Implementation Plan
USFOR-A	US Forces Afghanistan